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Abstract 
A major point of debate about morally good motives concerns an ambiguity in the truism that 
good and strong-willed people desire to do what‘s right. This debate is shaped by the assumption 
that ‘what‘s right‘ combines in only two ways with ‘desire‘, leading to distinct de dicto and de 
re readings of the truism. However, a third reading of such expressions is possible, first identified 
by Janet Fodor (1979/2014), which has gone wholly unappreciated by philosophers in this debate. 
I identify Fodor‘s non-specific reading of ‘desire to do what‘s right‘ and briefly discuss its merits.
1. Introduction
Philosophers who agree that the morally best kind of motivation requires a desire for 
what‘s right nevertheless disagree about how to understand that requirement.  This dis2 -
agreement originates in an ambiguity in the phrase ‘a desire for what‘s right‘, leading 
philosophers defend different readings of the requirement. This debate seems to pre-
suppose that the phrase has only two readings. However, outside of this debate, it is 
widely recognized that scope-ambiguous phrases like ‘a desire for what’s right’ have 
three distinct readings. The debate has wholly ignored the third reading. This paper de-
scribes it and argues that it claims some of the appealing features of the other two read-
ings.
 This paper originated in a reading group with Caleb Perl and Jonathan “Disco” Wright on von 1
Fintel and Heim’s Intensional Semantics during summer 2014 (?) at the University of Southern 
California. Particular thanks to them for many happy memories. Thanks also to, in no particular 
order, Mark Schroeder, Steve Finlay, Ralph Wedgwood, Nate Charlow, Nicholas Laskowski, Re-
nee Bolinger, Maegan Fairchild, Joe Horton, Alex Dietz, Kenneth Silver, Max Hayward, and 
Kenny Easwaran.
 Because the question of which motives are morally good is ancient, I focus on the discussion 2
succeeding and informed by Smith (1994). Earlier discussions from Copp (1995), Lillehammer 
(1997), and Dreier (2000) focus on this question as it relates to moral judgment externalism. 
More recent discussions focusing on the nature of good moral motivation itself include Olson 
(2002), Carbonnell (2013), Sliwa (2016), Aboodi (2017), and Isserow (2018; forthcoming).
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2. Identifying the Third Reading
In the context of the debate about whether moral judgments intrinsically motivate, 
Michael Smith (1994) reminds us that two very different kinds of desires can be de-
scribed as desires to do what‘s right. The ambiguity in this description is a general fea-
ture of expressions that combine quantifiers, including, following Hintikka, attitude 
verbs like ‘desire’, and phrasal complements. For example, “Jules wants to eat a Big 
Kahuna burger” is true of two distinct scenarios. In the first, Jules sees a specific burger 
and comes to want it, unaware that the burger is a Big Kahuna burger. This scenario 
corresponds to the expression‘s de re reading. On the second, Jules has heard of Big 
Kahuna burgers and he thinks of or cognizes the burgers he wants as Big Kahuna burg-
ers. This scenario corresponds to the expression‘s de dicto reading. 
The phrase ‘a desire to do what‘s right‘ also has de re and de dicto readings. The former 
implies a desire to do a particular action, which happens to be right. The latter implies a 
desire to do what the agent takes to be right, as such. Correspondingly, philosophers 
who agree that morally good motives require a desire to do what‘s right can still dis-
agree about whether that claim is to be understood de dicto or de re. However, arguments 
in this debate often seem to presuppose that ‘a desire to do what‘s right‘ has only these 
two readings. This presupposition is false. 
As Janet Fodor (1979/2014) first showed, expressions like “Jules wants to eat a Big 
Kahuna burger” have a third reading, which she calls the non-specific reading, contrast-
ing this with the ‘specific de re‘ and ‘non-specific de dicto‘ readings characterized above.  3
The more familiar specific de re reading requires that Jules wants a specific burger. The 
de dicto reading requires that Jules cognizes his desired burgers as Big Kahuna burgers. 
However, “Jules wants to eat a Big Kahuna burger” can be true on the third reading 
even if neither of these conditions is met. For example, suppose that to be a Big Kahuna 
burger is to be a burger garnished with a pineapple slice and yellow hibiscus sauce — 
the pineapple slice and hibiscus sauce are essential to and sufficient for being a Big 
 For further discussion of the non-specific reading, see Bäurle (1983), von Fintel and Heim 3
(2011), Égré (2014), and Keshet and Schwartz (2019).
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Kahuna burger.  Jules tries a Big Kahuna burger for the first time, falling for its unique 4
taste. If Jules craves any burger with pineapple and hibiscus, and, necessarily, only Big 
Kahuna burgers combine those ingredients, then we can accurately report Jules‘s crav-
ing with “Jules wants to eat a Big Kahuna burger”. But suppose that Jules doesn‘t want a 
particular burger nor do his desires deploy the concept Big Kahuna burger — that is, 
Jules does not cognize his desired burgers as Big Kahuna burgers. So the report is not 
true on either its specific de re or de dicto reading. But it is true on its non-specific reading 
for Jules has a de re desire for a particular kind of burger, of which only certain burgers 
are members.5
Since “Jules wants to eat a Big Kahuna burger” and “Jules desires to do what‘s right” 
share the relevant scopal features, the latter also allows a non-specific reading.  The 6
former is true on this reading when Jules wants a particular kind of burger but he does-
n‘t want a particular burger and he doesn‘t desire that kind of burger under the descrip-
tion ‘Big Kahuna burger‘. Likewise, the latter is true on this reading when Jules desires 
 In this sense, ‘Big Kahuna Burger‘ operates more like ‘Shepherd‘s Pie‘, denoting the result of a 4
particular combination of ingredients than it does ‘Brand X Burger‘, a burger by Brand X.
 Although there is widespread consensus about how to represent non-specific de dicto and spe5 -
cific de re readings, representing the non-specific reading is more controversial. von Fintel and 
Heim offer the following logical form as the ‘standard‘ intensional approach to representing the 
reading‘s logical form:
Jules wantsw0 [λw‘ [a Big-Kahuna-burgerw0] λx1 [PRO to eatw‘ x1]]
The formalization expresses, roughly, that in all of the worlds where Jules gets what he wants, 
he eats any burger that is actually a Big Kahuna burger.
 That the latter sentence involves an embedded wh-question clouds the scopal similarities of 6
the two sentences somewhat. However, Gronendijk and Stokhof (1982; 1984) demonstrates that 
interrogative phrases like ‘what‘s right‘ produce scopal ambiguities when embedded in opaque 
contexts. In particular, “Jules desires to do what‘s right” has the same scopal ambiguities as 
“Jules desires to do an act that is right”. Using von Fintel and Heim‘s ‘standard‘ approach, we 
can represent the latter claim‘s logical form as:
Jules desiresw0 [λw‘ [a right-actw0] λx1 [PRO to dow‘ x1]]
Roughly, when Jules satisfies the reading corresponding to this form, in all the worlds where he 
does what he desires, he does any act that is actually a morally right act. See also Sharvit (2002) 
for a particularly nuanced discussed of the scopal properties of embedded questions. See Woods 
(2014) for a related discussion concerning logic.
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to perform a particular kind of act but he doesn‘t want to perform any act in particular 
and he does not cognize the kind of act that he wants to perform as the morally right 
kind. 
For example, suppose (strictly for the purposes of illustration) that act utilitarianism is 
true so that an act is morally right just when and because it maximizes the balance of 
pleasure over pain. Imagine that Jules performs a pleasure-maximizing act and is over-
come with a warm tingle. Because of the tingle, Jules wants to do more acts of that plea-
sure-maximizing kind, which happen to be all and only the morally right acts. “Jules de-
sires to do what‘s right” is true on its non-specific reading in this situation. Jules desires 
to perform a particular kind of action — the morally right kind — even though he does 
not desire it under that description.7
As a result, there is cause to recognize a third position in the debate about which desires 
underlie morally good motivation: morally good motivation might require a non-specif-
ic desire to do what‘s right. This unacknowledged position is significant for two reasons. 
First, as I’ve already suggested, debate about moral motivation often seems to presup-
pose that individuals can desire to do what‘s right in only two ways. Second, the third 
reading combines some of the most attractive features of the first two readings, provid-
ing an attractive new basis for theorizing. I‘ll briefly explore these two features after ar-
ticulating a controversial assumption on which I‘ll rely throughout.
3. Non-Specific Desires and Opaque Contexts
Attitude terms create so-called ‘opaque‘ linguistic environments where the substitution 
of intensionally equivalent terms fails to preserve truth. For example, ‘Clark Kent‘ and 
‘Superman‘ are intensionally equivalent, denoting the same individual in all possibili-
 Of course, utilitarianism is probably not the true moral theory. There is likely a plurality of po7 -
tentially right-making features which includes being pleasure-maximizing along with being fair, 
being just, being honest, etc. Consequently, the motivational structure required to satisfy the 
non-specific reading will also have to be pluralistic. I‘ve assumed utilitarianism only for the 
purposes of exposition.
Page  of 4 15
Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right
ties.  However, Lois Lane might believe that Clark Kent wears glasses without believing 8
that Superman wears glasses. Substituting ‘Clark Kent‘ with an intensionally equivalent 
term, like ‘Superman‘, under the scope of an attitude verb affects the sentence‘s truth 
conditions. 
According to an orthodox explanation of this phenomenon, whether an attitude report 
is true depends on whether the sense of a given claim matches the sense in which the 
believer accepts it. The description or ‘sense‘ that Lois associates with the claim that 
Clark Kent wears glasses differs from the sense that she attaches to the claim that Su-
perman wears glasses.  That sense matches the sense expressed by “Clark Kent wears 9
glasses” but not “Superman wears glasses” even though those claims are intensionally 
equivalent.
Like beliefs, desires are widely assumed to be propositional attitudes. Unsurprisingly 
then, desire ascriptions, like belief ascriptions, do not seem support the inter-substitu-
tion of intensionally equivalent terms under the scope of ‘desire’. Just as above, Lois 
may want to kiss Superman even if she does not want to kiss Clark Kent. That‘s because 
the sense in which she desires to kiss someone involves a description that she attaches 
to “Lois kisses Superman” but not to “Lois kisses Clark”. More generally, for an arbi-
trary A, o, and F, the fact that Lois bears propositional attitude A to the possible state of 
affairs where o is F may not suffice to make attributions of the form ⌜Lois A‘s that o is F⌝ 
true.
Rather, a desire attribution is true only if the agent desires the relevant object under the 
description associated with the attribution. On an appealingly simple (but optional) 
way of thinking about this phenomenon, desires must deploy the concepts expressed by 
 I‘ll assume that a single individual can belong to distinct worlds.8
 I’m using ‘sense’ broadly and loosely. I explicitly disavow Fregean commits inessential to the 9
account, whichever those are.
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a given description to desire an object under that description.  On this approach, even 10
if woodchucks are necessarily groundhogs, Lois can desire to adopt a woodchuck but 
not a groundhog (each de dicto) if her desires deploy the concept woodchuck but not 
groundhog. Likewise, even if utilitarianism is true and what‘s right is necessarily what‘s 
pleasure-maximizing, Jules can desire to do what‘s pleasure-maximizing but not what‘s 
right (each de dicto), if his desires deploy is pleasure-maximizing but not is right.
As a special case of this phenomenon, unless Jules desires what‘s right under the right 
description, he does not satisfy “Jules desires to do what‘s right”, on its non-specific 
reading. What is the right description? I‘ll assume, controversially, that the description 
picks out the kind through the features distinctive of that kind. For example, a burger is 
a Big Kahuna burger in virtue of its pineapple slice and yellow hibiscus sauce. Conse-
quently, this assumption implies that Jules satisfies “Jules wants a Big Kahuna burger”, 
on its non-specific reading, only if Jules desires any burger that is garnished by a 
pineapple slice and yellow hibiscus sauce.  More generally, I‘ll assume that an agent A 11
satisfies “A wants what‘s K”, on its non-specific reading, only if (a) something belongs 
to K in virtue of being F and (b) A wants anything that is F in virtue of its being F, for a 
suitably restricted domain of Fs. In short, I‘m assuming that an agent non-specifically 
desires a member of a kind when the features that explain why an object belongs to a 
kind match the features that explain why the agent desires the object.
This assumption implies that Jules non-specifically desires to do what‘s right only if (a) 
an act is right in virtue of being F and (b) Jules wants to do anything that is F, for a suit-
ably restricted domain of Fs. It is widely assumed that something is right just when and 
 I’m assuming this approach simply for concreteness. The account that I propose is consistent 10
with other accounts of what it takes to have an attitude under a description that do not rely on 
concepts.
 This domain of burgers, over which ‘any burger‘ quantifies, is plausibly restricted: even 11
though Jules wants a Big Kahuna burger, in the non-specific sense, it goes without saying that 
he does not want a burger that‘s been dropped on the floor, even if it has a pineapple slice and 
yellow hibiscus sauce. The domain of burgers that Jules desires is restricted to those that haven‘t 
been dropped on the floor. Consequently, ‘anything‘ in (b) quantifies over only a restricted set of 
Fs. For more, see Fara (2013), Braun (2015), and Philips-Brown and Grant (forthcoming).
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because its right-making features outweigh its wrong-making features — just when its 
right-making features are sufficient. Consequently, only if Jules is attracted to the kind 
of actions whose right-making features are sufficient in virtue of their sufficiency does 
Jules satisfy “Jules desires to do what‘s right” on its non-specific reading, according to 
view that I am sketching. 
These claims are plausible but highly controversial. They presuppose not only that atti-
tude ascriptions are hyperintensional but also that non-specific desire attributions are 
sensitive to the features in virtue of which an object belongs to the desired kind. A 
deeper examination of non-specific desire attributions may very well cast doubt on 
these assumptions. Nevertheless, there is room for them at this relatively early stage of 
inquiry: no sustained discussion of the hyperintensional features of non-specific atti-
tude ascriptions yet exists. As such, although my claims may be controversial, they are 
also uncontested. I will therefore assume them given the apparent need for at least a 
minimal theory of sense for a plausible theory of non-specific desire attribution.
4. Applying the Third Reading
I‘ve just offered a brief sketch of the truth-conditions for attributions of non-specific 
moral motivation. An agent X satisfies, “X desires to do what‘s right”, on the non-specif-
ic reading, just when X desires to do the morally right kind of action in virtue of the fea-
tures that make those acts morally right. Note that desiring a kind of object in virtue of a 
certain feature shared by that kind does not require believing that the kind shares that 
feature. Jules can desire a Big Kahuna burger in virtue of its hibiscus sauce without be-
lieving anything about hibiscus sauce. Jules can just think, “Mmhmm! This is a tasty 
burger!” without reflecting on what makes the burger tasty. What explains Jules’s desire 
for the burger is the fact that it is topped with pineapple and hibiscus sauce. Likewise, I 
needn‘t believe that an act is right in virtue of its right-making features being sufficient 
in order to satisfy “Nathan desires to do what‘s right” on the non-specific reading. If 
suffices that my desire for that kind of act is explained by the fact that those acts pos-
sesses features that make them right.
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As we will now see, non-specific moral motivation, so construed, offers an attractive 
middle ground between the two dominant positions in the debate over what constitutes 
good moral motivation. The first position holds that good moral motivation requires a 
non-instrumental desire for what‘s right de re.  The second position holds that good 12
moral motivation requires a non-instrumental desire for what‘s right de dicto. Each posi-
tion has clear virtues: the first but not the second entails that good moral motivation re-
quires doing what is in fact right. The second but not the first entails that good moral 
motivation requires acting out of respect for morality. The rest of the paper sketches a 
case for the claim that non-specific moral motivation exemplifies each of these virtues 
without succumbing to their vices, which I will now discuss.
Smith (1994) rejects desiring to do what‘s right, de dicto, on the grounds that it inappro-
priately ‘fetishes‘ rightness itself, which risks alienating the agent from the features that 
make acts right, such as that they are just or fair. Smith (1994) supports this position 
(p.75) by rehearsing a point from Bernard Williams (1981). Williams describes a case 
from Fried where a husband can save either his wife or a stranger from drowning. 
Williams observes that, with sufficient philosophical ingenuity, we can wring the clearly 
correct implication that the husband may save the wife rather than the stranger from 
impartial moral theories like Kantian deontology or Utilitarianism. These Kantian and 
Utilitarian justifications, however, involve one thought too many. It shouldn‘t matter to 
the husband that the stranger lost a fair lottery or that the husband’s maxim of action 
can be universalized, argues Williams; it matters only that the husband‘s wife is drown-
ing. On Smith‘s reading, bizarre moral deliberations like those apparently recommend-
ed by Kantianism and Utilitarianism seem motivated by a de dicto desire for what‘s 
right. It would be inappropriate or fetishistic for the husband to have this desire be-
cause it seems to displace a desire for his wife‘s wellbeing. De dicto desires to do what‘s 
right are thus fetishistic because they supplant desires for what actually matters more 
generally, such as obligations to our loved ones, our promises, generalized benevolence, 
and so on.
 I‘m restricting my claims to non-instrumental motivation, desires that are not in the service of 12
promoting further desires. De re or de dicto motivation that‘s strictly instrumental on non-moral 
concerns is plainly not the morally best kind of motivation, so irrelevant for my purposes. 
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This first criticism is complemented by a second. While it may seem bad to displace the 
husband‘s desire for his wife‘s wellbeing, that’s genuinely worrying only if the  hus-
band‘s new desire is in some sense worse than the old one. Williams’ case does not en-
tail that a desire for rightness as such is bad; it merely suggests it. Smith regards its 
badness as common sense. I agree. However, we could reasonably ask for an argument 
for this claim.
Drawing on observations from Philip Stratton-Lake (2000), Jonathan Dancy (2000; 2005) 
and, ultimately, Philippa Foot concerning the ‘verdictive‘ nature of rightness, we might 
hold that goodness is a measure of value. Something is good when it is of sufficient val-
ue, just as something is tall when it is of sufficient height. But just as it‘s a mistake to 
think that tallness has a certain quantity of height rather than being a measure of a cer-
tain quantity of height, it‘s a mistake to think that goodness has a certain quantity of 
value rather than being a measure of a certain quantity of value. If goodness merely rep-
resents a degree of value but does not itself possess value (just as tallness doesn‘t have a 
height), and if it is not good to desire the valueless, then it is not good to desire good-
ness itself, apart from desiring good things. Similarly, moral rightness can be under-
stood as simply a measure of support by moral reasons. Desiring the property of moral 
rightness itself, as suggested by the de dicto reading, desires the measure and not what is 
measured, which is what genuinely deserves moral concern. This is why many 
philosophers find the de dicto account of moral motivation unappealing.
However, the competing de re account is not without its faults either. In particular, a de 
re desire for what‘s right does not suffice for the morally best kind of motivation. Plau-
sibly, such motivation requires being motivated to perform a morally right action. Act-
ing with a de re desire for what‘s right entails that acts rightly. But it does not suffice for 
the morally best kind of motivation, so-called “morally worthy” motivation. Famously, 
the shopkeeper in Kant‘s Groundwork wants to treat his customers honestly. Treating his 
customers honestly is the right thing to do. Consequently, the shopkeeper desires to do 
what‘s right, read de re. However, it turns out that this shopkeeper is indifferent to 
morality; he does not “act out of respect for the moral law as such”. Rather, he is com-
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pletely selfish. Ordinarily, this selfishness would lead him to defraud his customers. 
However, the shopkeeper believes that his shop will succeed only if it has a reputation 
for honesty. Consequently, the shopkeeper‘s selfishness leads him to desire to do what‘s 
right, de re. But his motives are clearly morally deficient. As a result, de re moral motiva-
tion is insufficient for good moral motivation.
While some, most explicitly Markovits (2010), defend the de re approach to moral moti-
vation against challenging cases like Kant‘s shopkeeper through a match between the 
non-instrumental moral reasons for an action and the agent‘s non-instrumental motivat-
ing reasons for the action, others argue that de re moral motivation is incompatible with 
moral worth.  According to Sliwa (2016) and likeminded philosophers such as Zoe 13
Johnson King, de re motivation only ever produces accidentally right actions because the 
right-making features that sometimes underlie de re desires are defeasible. For example, 
just because an act is, for example, fair doesn‘t entail that it‘s right — the fair division of 
disputed land may have catastrophic effects that make the fair division wrong. As such, 
right-making features, as opposed to rightness itself, are only contingently right-mak-
ing. Sliwa argues that de re motivation premised on right-making features therefore 
produces only contingently — indeed, argues Sliwa, only accidentally — right action. As 
such, de re motivation cannot be the morally best kind of motivation.14
To sum up, both (non-instrumental) de re and de dicto moral motivation have attractive 
features: the former entails that the performed act is right, the latter entails that the act 
is performed out of explicitly moral concern. However, each approach is flawed. The 
former allows for the accidental overlap of morally right action with non-moral motiva-
tion, as in the case of Kant‘s shopkeeper. The latter risks alienating the agent from the 
features of right actions that merit non-derivative concern, such as fairness, justice, the 
promotion of equality, honesty, and the like.
 I think that challenges to Markovits’ account flow from misunderstanding the ontology of 13
reasons. I defend an analysis that closely resembles hers by rethinking the ontology of reasons 
in Howard (forthcoming 1). For a competing but similar approach, see Portmore (forthcoming).
 I show that this argument is flawed in Howard (forthcoming 2).14
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As I’ll now argue, non-specific moral motivation — at least the version that I‘ve laid  out 
above — appears to share these two strengths without the two weaknesses. Conclusive-
ly establishing that this is true requires more space than I have here. So I‘ll make a pro-
visional case for non-specific moral motivation, which I hope will spur further interest 
from philosophers interested in virtue and moral motivation.
De re moral motivation is appealing partly because it entails that the performed action is 
morally right. Non-specific moral motivation shares this virtue. Just as “Jules wants a 
Big Kahuna burger” is true on its non-specific reading only if the burgers that Jules 
wants are in fact Big Kahuna burgers, “Jules wants to do what‘s right” is true on its non-
specific reading only if what Jules wants to do is in fact morally right. De dicto motiva-
tion does not have this implication. Agents with false beliefs about what’s right desire to 
do what’s right, de dicto, but their desires require them to break the moral law, not fol-
low it.
In spite of this flaw, de dicto moral motivation is attractive because it entails a concern 
for morality. It involves moral concern because it deploys the concept morally right. 
Non-specific moral motivation also seems to entail a concern for morality, although of a 
different sort. For example, Jules has a non-specific desire for a Big Kahuna burger in 
virtue of desiring a particular kind of burger. His desire for the Big Kahuna kind of 
burger, rather than another kind of burger, is explained by the very features that make a 
burger a Big Kahuna burger — the pineapple slice and hibiscus sauce. Likewise, Jules 
has a non-specific desire for what‘s right in virtue of desiring a particular kind of act 
without desiring that kind under the description morally right. His desire for the morally 
right kind of action, rather than any another kind of action, is explained by the the 
strength of the features that make the act right, such as its fairness or honesty. Conse-
quently, Jules desires what‘s right, on the non-specific reading, only if he is concerned 
with the features that make acts right. So non-specific moral motivation clearly entails a 
concern for morality
It also appears that non-specific moral motivation lacks the flaws associated with de re 
and de dicto motivation, respectively. As we saw with Kant‘s shopkeeper, de re motiva-
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tion allows for only accidentally right action when doing what‘s morally right acciden-
tally overlaps with what promotes the agent‘s non-moral desires. Because non-specific 
moral motivation, in contrast, implies that the agent desires a kind of action, it rules out 
many cases of accidental overlap. The shopkeeper desires to do what‘s right, de re, but 
he doesn‘t desire to do the right kind of action. So he lacks a non-specific desire for 
what’s right. To be clear, there is still room for some accidental overlap in cases of non-
specific moral motivation, as when an agent (non-specifically) desires to do what‘s right 
in order to be praised. But, it seems that we can rule out this kind of overlap by restrict-
ing our attention to non-instrumental, non-specific moral motivation.
Finally, non-specific moral motivation, unlike de dicto motivation, is not subject to the 
charge that it embodies a kind of moral fetishism that risks alienating an agent from the 
features of actions that them right, which merit non-derivative concern. As we‘ve seen, 
just as motivation by the features that make something a Big Kahuna burger is neces-
sary for satisfying “Jules wants a Big Kahuna burger” on its non-specific reading, moti-
vation by the features that make actions morally right is necessary for satisfying “Jules 
wants to do what‘s right” on its non-specific reading. Consequently, non-specific moral 
motivation does not alienate agents from the features of actions that make them right. 
On the contrary, it implies motivation by them.
I fall short of full-throated endorsement of non-specific moral motivation. The features 
that make non-specific moral motivation attractive are at least partly grounded in con-
testable claims about hyperintensionality and how it constrains desire attributions. 
Nevertheless, non-specific moral motivation clearly deserves attention from theorists 
working on questions of moral worth and moral fetishism, beyond discussion here.
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